<p>When Roosevelt made his 1939 request for funds, the Army air strength was split into the Air Corps, which was essentially a training organization, and the GHQAF, which was a mobile, tactical air force. In March 1939, GHQAF was assigned to the command of the Chief of the Air Corps, General Arnold. Airmen hardly had time to get used to the new arrangement when it was changed again. GHQAF was given a separate status, but under the commander of Army field forces. To soften the blow, perhaps, Arnold was named Acting Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, and was in an excellent position to coordinate all air power.
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<p>It was another one of the innumerable steps that airmen kept hoping would lead to independence. In March 1941, Robert A. Lovett, one of the Navy's original pilot cadre in World War I, was named Assistant Secretary of War for Air. He reorganized the air power once again and it became the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) by Regulation 95-5 dated 20 June 1941. Arnold was named Chief of the AAF, and was given the responsibility for plans and policies for aviation. He reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff, and also kept his position as Deputy Chief.
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<p>Reorganizing was only a cosmetic solution to the real problem: how to expand for war rapidly and efficiently. The Air Corps began with a program that had been developed in the spring of 1939. The goal then was to have 24 combat-ready groups of tactical aircraft by mid-1941. In May 1940, that plan was revised upward to a new goal of 41 combat-ready groups. Before July 1940, it was 54 groups. One year later, the Air Corps projected a need for 84 groups by mid-1942. In a little over two years, the planned tactical force had been virtually quadrupled.
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<p>Expanding a military force requires increases in numbers of weapons, personnel and facilities. All of these physical accoutrements of expansion were lacking in the years before Pearl Harbor's destruction.
